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COMMENT
Greater Public Participation in the
Enforcement of the Clean Water Act
John Bliss
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Sierra Club
v. Electronic Control Design, Inc. that monies paid by
violators of the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA) to set-
tle a citizen suit may be used to fund environmental
projects unrelated to the settled violation. This decision
has been opposed by the Department of Justice and runs
counter to the trend of recent Supreme Court holdings
which generally restrict citizen suits. This article exam-
ines the citizen suit provisions of the CWA, the Elec-
tronic Control Design decision and the arguments
against it, and analyzes the shortcomings of the decision.
Since the first citizen suit provision was included in the
Clean Air Act in 1970,' congressional action2 and federal court
decisions' have tailored and refined the role of the private cit-
1. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304, 84 Stat. 1676, 1706
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982)).
2. LISA JORGENSON & JEFFERS KIMMEL, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUIT: CON-
FRONTING THE CORPORATION 3 (BNA Special Report)(1988).
3. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971); Middlesex County Sewerage
1
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izen in the enforcement of environmental statutes. In a recent
decision within this evolution, Sierra Club v. Electronic Con-
trol Design, Inc., (Electronic Control Design II)," a court of
appeals held for the first time5 that parties may settle citizen
suits under the Clean Water Act (CWA) 6 with consent judg-
ments7 that provide for payments to fund environmental
projects unrelated to the original violation.8 The decision rec-
ognized that public participation in enforcement of the CWA
may include a voice in directing recovered funds toward envi-
ronmental projects. This appellate decision runs counter to
the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions which have re-
stricted the use of citizen suits,' and may have important con-
sequences because CWA citizen suits have proliferated in re-
cent years1" and can involve substantial sums of money.1"
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v.
Cheasapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
493 U.S. 20 (1989).
4. 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).
5. District courts in many different circuits have approved settlements which
provide for such payments. Sierra Club v. Electronic Control Design,(Electronic Con-
trol Design I), 703 F. Supp. 875, 878 (D. Or. 1989) (citing Sierra Club v. Port Town-
send Paper Corp., Civ. No. C87-316C (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28,,1988), Friends of the
Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 656 F. Supp. 513 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Natural Resource
Defense Council v. Duquensne Light Co., Civ. No 87-0511 (D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1987).
This is the first court of appeals decision to consider whether such payments are
legal.
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). The stat-
ute authorizes any citizen to commence a civil action:
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the elev-
enth amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A)
an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such standard or limitation.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988).
7. "A judgment, the provisions and terms of which are settled and agreed to by
the parties to an action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (5th ed. 1979).
8. Electronic Control Design H, 909 F.2d at 1356.
9. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1 (1981) (holding citizen suit provision of the CWA may not be used to sue for private
damages). Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987) (limiting citizen suit jurisdiction to present but not past violations); Hallstrom
v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (construing strictly notice provisions of envi-
ronmental statutes).
10. JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 2, at 12.
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Under the decision, monies paid in settlement may fund a
range of environmental projects' 2 not tied to the original vio-
lations; citizen groups may construct their settlements with
violators to fund projects which they feel most deserving. 13
The court of appeals held that district courts may approve of
such payments, even though the payments are outside the re-
lief authorized by the CWA, 14 and rejected the government's
position that the payments should be considered penalties
which the CWA requires be paid to the United States
Treasury.5
Part I of this Note introduces the factual and procedural
history of Electronic Control Design. Part II presents the pri-
mary principles of law applied in this case, including a brief
outline of the operation and use of consent judgments by the
courts, the relevant portions of the citizen suit provisions of
the CWA, and the legislative history of those provisions. Part
III outlines the Department of Justice's arguments against
such payments, the counterarguments made by the Sierra
Club, and then surveys other cases in which courts have ruled
on the issues presented by those arguments. Part IV sets forth
the lower court and court of appeals decisions in Electronic
Control Design. Part V presents an analysis of the Electronic
Control Design decision which consists of three sections. Sec-
tion A explicates and critiques the court of appeals decision as
compared to the district court decision with regard to the ap-
propriate degree of inquiry necessary for approving CWA con-
sent judgments. Section B presents a comparison of the ways
in which an apparent conflict between statements of the Su-
11. Student Public Interest Group v. Hercules, Inc., Civ. No. 83-3262 (D.N.J.
Apr. 6, 1989) (1.68 million dollar settlement under the CWA).
12. The funds may go to related as well as unrelated environmental projects,
since it is the parties not the court which determine the terms of a consent judgment.
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731 (1986); United States v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 (1975) ("[Cjonsent decrees are normally compromises in
which the parties give up some thing they might have won in litigation and waive
their rights to litigation .... [T]hey should be basically construed as contracts.")
13. Marcia R. Gelpe, Pollution Control Laws Against Public Facilities,.13 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 69, 99:100 (1989).
14. Electronic Control Design 11, 909 F.2d at 1354-55.
15. Id. at 1354.
19921
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preme Court and the legislative history of the CWA have been
resolved by the court of appeals, the district court, the gov-
ernment, and the Sierra Club. Section C examines why the
appellate decision does not fully protect the public interest
and explores ways in which district courts may address this.
Part VI assesses the impact which Electronic Control Design
may have on the settlement of CWA citizen suits in other
circuits.
I. Factual Setting and Procedural History
The Sierra Club believed that Electronic Control Design,
Inc. was discharging pollutants from its printed circuit board
manufacturing plant into the Milk Creek in excess of the fa-
cility's NPDES permit. Sierra Club filed the appropriate no-
tice to the United States and the State of Oregon of its intent
to bring a citizen suit under section 505 of the CWA'8 alleging
violation by Electronic Control Design of section 301(a) of the
CWA. 17 Neither the United States nor the State of Oregon
chose to bring an enforcement action or intervene in the
suit.18 After the suit was commenced, the parties agreed to a
series of stipulated extensions in the litigation schedule to
permit compliance negotiations.' 9 As a result, Electronic Con-
trol Design complied with the terms of its permit for several
months.20 At the same time, the parties entered into settle-
ment negotiations which resulted in a proposed consent judg-
ment. The proposed consent judgment provided that Elec-
tronic Control Design would: 1) comply with the terms of its
permit; 2) pay a total of $45,000 to several third party envi-
ronmental organizations; 3) pay stipulated penalties if Elec-
tronic Control Design violated the terms of its permit within
the period September 1, 1988 to June 1, 1989; and 4) pay
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
18. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Sierra Club v. Electronic Control Design, 909 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-35120) [hereinafter Brief for Sierra Club].
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id.
[Vol. 9
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$5,000 in attorneys' fees to the Sierra Club.2
As required, the parties notified the government of the
proposed consent judgment. The government as amicus cu-
riae objected that the consent judgment did not require Elec-
tronic Control Design to pay any monetary penalty to the
United States Treasury." The district court considered and
refused to approve the settlement because it found that the
terms of the settlement violated the CWA by providing for
payment of a penalty to a private environmental group rather
than to the United States Treasury.23 The case went before
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on interlocutory
appeal. 4
II. Background
A. Consent Judgments
A consent judgment is a negotiated settlement which be-
comes a judgment after court approval." Consent judgments"
provide parties flexibility in settling their suits with a mini-
mum of judicial supervision." Through these judgments, the
parties to a lawsuit contractually agree to compromise their
differences.2" When the compromise is approved by the court,
it has the same effect as any other judicial decree." Consent
judgments are the favored method for settling lawsuits be-
cause they achieve a result which is agreeable to the parties
21. Id. at 6-8.
22. Electronic Control Design II, 909 F.2d at 1352.
23. Id. at 1354.
24. Id. at 1353.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (5th ed. 1979).
26. Most citizen suits are settled through consent judgments. JORGENSON & KIM-
MEL, supra note 2, at 17. The government also uses consent judgments to settle its
litigation. The standards which set out acceptable terms for a consent judgment for a
CWA violation when the government is the plaintiff are set out in EPA's Clean
Water Act-Penalty Policy for Civil Settlement Negotiations. See infra note 109. The
main issue presented in Electronic Control Design is what are the appropriate stan-
dards for a CWA settlement when a private citizen is the plaintiff.
27. Id.
28. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 (1975).
29. The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement,
72 HARV. L. REv. 1314, 1316 n.18 (1959) [hereinafter Instrument of Compromise].
1992]
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with a minimal expenditure of judicial resources. 30 As judg-
ments, they have a res judicata effect so that the basic ele-
ments of the decree may not be relitigated3 ' and a violation of
the decree can lead to a contempt of court citation.3 2
B. Case Law
In environmental suits, citizen plaintiffs may sue for the
relief which a statute authorizes.33 In an important exception
to this rule, recognized in Local No. 93, International Associ-
ation of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,3 ' the Supreme
Court held that a court may approve a consent judgment
which includes relief which is not available if the suit is liti-
gated through to completion, provided that the decree: 1)
"spring[s] from and must resolve a dispute within the court's
subject matter jurisdiction"; 5 2) "come[s] within the general
scope of the case made by the pleadings"; 6 3) "further[s] the
objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based, ' 37
and 4) "[does] not dispose of the claims of a third party. '3 8
In approving consent judgments, courts generally confine
their inquiry to whether the agreement is fundamentally fair,
adequate and reasonable, and refrain from deciding the case
on its merits .3 In certain cases, some commentators have ar-
gued that additional review by the court is necessary to pro-
tect the public interest.40 These commentators have distin-
guished between public and private consent judgments.1 In
30. E.g., Jeff D. v. Andrus, 888 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1989).
31. Instrument of Compromise, supra note 29, at 1320.
32. Id. at 1316 n.18.
33. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1145-46 (E.D.
Pa. 1982).
34. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
35. Id. at 525.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 529.
39. EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1985).
40. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Forward: Public Law Liti-
gation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-6 (1982); Maimon Schwarzschild,
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Ne-
gotiated Institutional Reform, 5 DUKE L.J. 887 (1984).
41. Chayes, supra note 40, at 4-6; Schwarzschild, supra note 40, at 887.
[Vol. 9
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contrast to private consent judgments which only affect the
rights of the parties, public consent judgments involve the ap-
plication of public policy and affect the interests of many per-
sons not a party to the lawsuit. Consequently, reviewing
courts should consider the effect of a proposed consent judg-
ment on the public interest.4 '
According to this distinction, environmental suits are
public in nature. Settlement of these suits determines how en-
vironmental statutes are enforced and consequently affect
millions of persons. Courts have required that the "public in-
terest" be protected as a condition of approving an environ-
mental consent judgment.43
Courts have allowed the "public interest" to be repre-
sented in different ways depending on whether the plaintiff is
a private citizen or the government. In approving consent
judgments which resolve citizen initiated enforcement actions
based on the CWA, the courts rely on the government to voice
any objection that the settlement is not in the public inter-
est.44 However, in United States v. Ketchikan,45 where the
government was the plaintiff, the court held that conducting a
full evidentiary hearing to justify the settlement terms was
unnecessary to protect the public interest.4" The court held
that such a hearing would amount to the equivalent of a full
trial and was a waste of judicial resources since the parties
and the amicus had provided an adequate record for the court
to assess the public interest.47
42. Schwarzschild, supra note 40, at 887.
43. Courts have generally assessed the public interest by allowing the Depart-
ment of Justice either as an intervenor or as amicus curiae to voice objections when a
private citizen group seeks to reach a consent judgment with a polluter. See Pennsyl-
vania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Bellefonte Borough, 718 F. Supp. 431, 434 (M.D. Pa.
1989); Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1779 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). When the government seeks a consent judgment with a viola-
tor, courts have allowed interested parties (private citizen groups) to intervene for
purposes of presenting their views but not for objecting to the terms of the settle-
ment. United States v. Ketchikan, 430 F. Supp. 83 (D. Alaska 1977).
44. Bellefonte, 718 F. Supp. 431; Archer Daniels, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1779.
45. 430 F. Supp. 83 (D. Alaska 1977).
46. Id. at 86.
47. Id.
1992]
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C. Statutory
In the scheme of the CWA, section 505 allows private citi-
zens to bring a citizen suit in the government's place when the
government has failed to act. ' Under section 505, a private
citizen may sue for the relief of injunctive action and penal-
ties"" as provided in section 309 of the CWA.50 The role of
citizen suits, as originally envisioned, was that of supplemen-
tal enforcer.5 1 Federal and state governments were to be the
primary enforcers of the CWA, and the function of citizen
suits was to assure that those governmental bodies diligently
enforced the Act.52
As environmental law evolved, citizen suits took a larger
48. A citizen plaintiff must give the government appropriate notice of his/her
intent to sue. The government has 60 days to commence its own action. If at the end
of that 60 day period, the government has failed to act, the citizen/plaintiff may com-
mence a suit against the violator. Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 493 U.S. 20, 26 (1989). A
plaintiff must demonstrate a cognizable injury to herself in order to have standing to
sue. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1971). However, an aesthetic injury to
the environment which a person (or the members of a group) uses is cognizable. Id.
49. The Clean Water Act allows citizen groups to sue for civil penalties as well as
injunctive relief such as requesting a court to order a violator to take remedial action.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d). It is unlike its model, the Clean Air Act, which only allows
for injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
50. Section 309 of the CWA allows the government to sue for injunctive action
and civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day per violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d)
(1988). Section 505(a) of the CWA allows citizens to sue for the same penalties as the
government under section 309(d). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
51. REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE CoMMIrEE ON THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 116 CONG.
REC. 42,382 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie) "Although the Senate did not advocate
[citizen suits] as the best way to achieve enforcement, it is clear that they should be
an effective tool.") Id. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act (CAA) citizen suit
provision is often cited with reference to the CWA because it was enacted two years
before the CWA and served as the model for the CWA's citizen suit provision. See
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 23 & n.1 (1989); Marcia R. Gelpe &
Janus L. Barnes, Penalties in Settlement of Citizen Suit Enforcement Actions under
the Clean Water Act, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1025, 1026 n.3 (1990).
52. At the time when the original citizen suit provision in the CAA was enacted,
the theory of agency capture had wide acceptance. Under this theory, organizations
captured the agencies which were supposed to regulate them because the staff of
those agencies would later seek employment with the organizations. To offset this
phenomenon, citizens were given the power to bring suits if the government failed to
act. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Prelimi-
nary Assessment of Citizen Suits under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L.
REV. 833, 843 and n.12 & 13 (1985).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/11
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role than originally envisioned by Congress. In response, Con-
gress included in the 1987 amendments to the CWA5 s specific
sections which placed additional safeguards on the public in-
terest with regard to citizen suits." First, Congress amended
section 309 to include objective criteria upon which civil pen-
alties for violation of the CWA must be based. 5 Second, Con-
gress added section 505(c)(3) which forbids consent judgments
from being entered unless the parties have given the govern-
ment forty-five days notice of the proposed agreement.56 The
purpose of this provision is to allow the Department of Justice
to voice any objection to any "abusive, collusive, or inade-
quate settlements and to maintain the ability of the Govern-
ment to set its own enforcement priorities. '57 Third, Congress
added section 505(d) to provide that attorneys' fees in a CWA
citizen suit may only be awarded to prevailing or substantially
prevailing parties.5 8 Frivolous suits are thereby discouraged
since unsuccessful plaintiffs must bear their own attorney
costs.
In connection with these amendments, the legislative his-
tory contains a statement upon which the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals based its decision in Electronic Control Design H.
The legislative conferees encourage where appropriate the use
of penalties to fund "research, development and other related
53. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
54. JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 2, at 3.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seri-
ousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting
from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to
comply with applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on
the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.
Id.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3).
57. 131 CONG. REC. Part II, S737 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1987) (statement of Senator
Chaffee).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). This amendment codified the decision in Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983), which held that it was not appropriate to award
attorneys' fees in a citizen suit unless the plaintiff prevailed in his suit. Id. at 694. To
qualify as a partially prevailing party, a citizen/plaintiff must achieve "some success,
even if not major success." Id. at 687-88.
1992]
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projects. . .to investigate pollution problems other than those
leading to the violation. Settlements of this type preserve the
punitive nature of enforcement actions while putting the
funds collected to use on behalf of the environmental
protection." 59
III. Comparison of the Government and Sierra Club
Arguments
A. The Government's Position
The government's consistent position has been that con-
sent judgments are acceptable only if a sizable portion of the
settlement is paid to the United States Treasury as a penalty
and that any environmental projects receiving monies are re-
medial in nature, closely related to the underlying violation. 0
The government's reasoning is that citizen enforcers have only
limited jurisdiction to enforce the act. 1 Under the statute, cit-
izens may sue for the specific remedies of civil penalties and
injunctive action.62
The government objected to the proposed consent judg-
ment resolving Electronic Control Design because the settle-
ment provided for payments for environmental projects unre-
lated to the original violation. The government argued the
payments were unlawful either as penalties or injunctive ac-
tion. " The language of the statute is mandatory,64 requiring
the imposition of penalties in virtually all cases.6 5 Thus, a por-
59. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1986) reprinted in 132
CONG. REC. H10,571 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
60. See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey Inc. v. Powell Duffryn
Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 82 (3d Cir. 1990); Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v.
Bellefonte Borough, 718 F. Supp. 431, 435 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Friends of the Earth v.
Archer Daniels Midland Co., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1779 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
61. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Sierra Club v. Electronic
Control Design, 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-35120) [hereinafter Brief for
United States] (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.27 (1981)).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) & (d) (1988).
63. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 20, 27.
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988). "[A]ny person who violates [the CWA] shall be
subject to a civil penalty .. " Id.
65. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 24, (citing Stoddard v. Western
[Vol. 9
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tion of any CWA settlement must include a penalty.
Under Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found.66 and Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n 6 7 any civil penalties assessed must be
paid to the United States Treasury. Some of the money
which is paid in settlement of a CWA suit may be put to use
in remedial environmental projects because section 309(d) of
the CWA states that "any good faith efforts to comply with
applicable requirements""9 may be taken into account in set-
ting any penalty. Money paid to mitigation projects 7 can be
used to partially reduce penalties payable to the United
States Treasury because such payments show good faith ef-
forts.71 Money paid to unrelated projects are unlawful because
such payments are not made to "comply with applicable
requirements. 72
According to the government, payments for environmen-
tal projects other than mitigation are not allowable under the
court's broad injunctive power because a court's injunctive
reach "may extend no farther than required by the nature of
the violation. '73 To allow settlement payments to go to envi-
ronmental projects not directly related to the violation would
amount to citizen suits becoming funding vehicles for projects
of the plaintiff's choice. 74 Such settlements would violate the
CWA because they would be for private not public interests.75
Such payments would also not be available under the excep-
Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986)).
66. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). "If the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may
order injunctive relief and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United States
Treasury." Id. at 53.
67. 453 U.S. at 14 n.25. "Under the [CWA], civil penalties, payable to the Gov-
ernment, also may be ordered by the court." Id.
68. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 27.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
70. Projects to mitigate the environmental damage caused by the violation.
71. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 21.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id. (citing General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399
(1982)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 24.
19921
11
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
tion set forth in Local No. 93,76 because the settlement does
not "further the objectives of the law upon which the com-
plaint was based.""' The objective of the CWA is to abate
water pollution, not raise funds for private projects.78
B. Sierra Club's Position
The role of the court in approving a consent judgment is
fundamentally different than that of a court in reaching an
adjudication on the merits. In approving a consent judgment,
the main inquiry is whether the public interest is served. 9
The public interest is served in a number of ways by settle-
ments which provide for payments to public interest organiza-
tions. First the money is put to environmentally beneficial
use, while at the same time the punitive nature of a penalty is
preserved. 0 Second, the payments further the goals of the
CWA8'1 by funding new8" or existing 83 public interest endow-
ments. Third, the payments are a powerful enforcement
mechanism," providing for enforcement where the state or
government has failed to act and recovering tens of millions of
dollars.8 5
The government's argument that penalties must be paid
to the United States Treasury is incorrect. The legislative his-
tory of the 1987 amendments to the CWA clearly shows that
Congress encourages settlements of fines and penalties to
fund related projects which further the goals of the CWA and
to investigate problems other than those leading to the viola-
tion.86 Supreme Court decisions8 7 which said that penalties
76. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525, 529.
77. Id. at 525.
78: Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 29.
79. Brief for the Sierra Club, supra note 18, at 13, (citing United States v. Sey-
mour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (S.D. Ind. 1982)).
80. Brief for Sierra Club, supra note 18, at 14.
81. Id. at 15.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id.'at 16.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14
[Vol. 9
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/11
PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
must be paid to the United States Treasury did not deal di-
rectly with the issue of payment of penalties to public interest
organizations. Rather, they were concerned with whether indi-
viduals could use the CWA to recover private damages.8 8 Con-
gress intended that settlement money from CWA suits be put
to environmentally beneficial use. To carry out congressional
intent, it is how the money is used that is relevant, not who
designates that use. 9
Even if penalties must be paid to the United States Trea-
sury, payments to environmental groups are allowable because
they are not penalties. Under Local No. 93 consent judgments
may include terms broader than available under the statute,
provided certain conditions are met.9 0 Those conditions are
met when the settlement provides for a cessation of the viola-
tion. Payments to public interest organizations are consistent
with Congress' desire to encourage settlements which benefit
the environment."' In addition, the settlements do not dispose
of the rights of third persons since the EPA is free to pursue
its own enforcement actions.2
C. Comparison Between the Government and Sierra Club
Positions
The arguments advanced by the Department of Justice
and Sierra Club raise several issues which are fundamental to
the result in Electronic Control Design. Both sides agree that
money may not be paid to promote private interests. The gov-
ernment's position is that the private character of the citizen/
plaintiff, who designates where the money is to be spent, de-
termines whether the settlement promotes private interests . 3
Sierra Club's position is that the use of the money determines
n.25 (1981); Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 53
(1987).
88. Brief for Sierra Club, supra note 18, at 25 n.12.
89. Id. at 25.
90. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525-529.
91. Brief for Sierra Club, supra note 18, at 26.
92. Id. at 27.
93. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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whether the settlement promotes public or private interests. 4
In advancing its position the government argues that a literal,
narrow reading of the statute is appropriate.9 Sierra Club's
position is that a broader interpretation which relies on the
legislative history is correct."6
Finally, the two sides disagree on how the public interest
is protected. The Government argues that the public interest
is violated when payments are paid to private groups," while
Sierra Club maintains that the public interest is protected by
cessation of the violation and funding of environmentally ben-
eficial projects.9 8
D. Related Court Decisions
Courts have addressed these issues a number of times
with differing results. The United States Supreme Court in
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo99 considered whether the
courts' normally broad equitable power in deciding relief was
restricted by the language and statutory scheme of the
CWA. 1°0 The Court held that the CWA did not require the
issuance of an injunction for dumping without a permit. 10 1
Weinberger suggests that the CWA contemplates the exercise
of discretion and balancing of equities and that courts may
use their traditional equitable powers in approving consent
decrees.102
In Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Pow-
ell Duffryn Terminals,'0 3 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether the approval of payments to public inter-
est groups as part of a CWA enforcement action was within
94. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
99. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
100. Id. at 306-16.
101. Id. at 318.
102. Id.
103. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
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the court's equitable power."' The court held that a court
could approve such payments through its equitable powers,
but that if these payments were labeled as penalties then the
monies must be paid to the United States Treasury. 05
A district court in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Found. v. Bellefonte'0 considered whether under the CWA
settlements must include mandatory civil penalties payable to
the United States Treasury.0 7 The court held that settle-
ments could provide for monies directed to environmental
projects and need not include penalties paid to the United
States Treasury.108 To protect the public interest, the court
adopted the EPA's Clean Water Act-Penalty Policy for Civil
Settlement Negotiations'0 9 which provides that environmen-
tal projects are acceptable only if they are closely related to
the underlying environmental harm."0 By requiring that pay-
ments be made to remedial projects,"' the court insured that
such payments could not be improperly made to private
interests.
Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co."'
considered whether penalties must be paid to the United
104. Id. at 82.
105. Id.
106. 718 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
107. Id. at 435-37.
108. Id. at 436.
109. Id. at 436-37. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACT-PEN-
ALTY POLICY FOR CIVIL SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (Feb. 11, 1986). This policy, which
is binding on governmental but not private settlements, governs EPA's use of consent
judgments to settle CWA suits. It includes formulas for determining the size of civil
penalties which are paid to the United States Treasury. In addition, it contains a
requirement that environmental projects which are included in settlements must mit-
igate the harm caused by the original violation. In its ruling in Bellefonte, the court
adopted the mitigation rule. An analysis by Donald Stever in Environmental Penal-
ties and Environmental Trusts-Constraints on New Sources of Funding for Envi-
ronmental Preservation, 17 Envtl. L. Rep, (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,356 (1987), would sup-
port the conclusion that the primary concern of EPA's Penalty Policy mitigation rule
is compliance with the Miscellaneous Fees Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (1988) rather than
environmental welfare. Because the Miscellaneous Fees Act applies only to the gov-
ernment, this policy consideration is not applicable to private citizens settlements.
110. Bellefonte, 718 F. Supp. at 437.
111. Id. at 437-38.
112. 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1779 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
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States Treasury and whether environmental projects funded
by the payments must be directly related to the original
harm.1 13 That court held that penalties in settlements under
the CWA may be paid to environmental projects rather than
the United States Treasury and that there is no requirement
that projects be directly related to the underlying violation.""
The court noted in dicta that there was considerable sup-
port for the government's position that payments in CWA cit-
izen suits may never be paid to private individuals." 5 The
court opined that it would approve of the consent order if it
was reformulated to make a settlement payment to a state
sponsored environmental water quality control program. 6
The court's objective was to guarantee that the money be
spent improving New York State water quality and not be di-
verted to private interests."1 7
IV. Electronic Control Design
A. The Decision of the District Court
The district court held that it could not approve the set-
tlement between Electronic Control Design, Inc. and Sierra
Club because its terms violated the CWA.118 The court rea-
soned that the sole purpose of section 505 is to provide pri-
vate parties with a mechanism to compel enforcement of the
effluent standards promulgated under the CWA. 19 Citizen
participation in enforcement of the CWA is to be carefully
channeled, limited to seeking injunctive relief and civil penal-
ties for violations.2 0 The legislative history of the CWA
makes it clear that private citizens may not sue for damages
and that civil penalties must be paid to the United States
113. Id. at 1780.
114. Id. at 1782.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1783.
117. Id.
118. Electronic Control Design I, 703 F. Supp. at 879.
119. Id. at 876.
120. Id.
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Treasury.121 The court further held that the settlement pay-
ments to private environmental groups must either be penal-
ties or damages. 122 If the payments are characterized as penal-
ties, they are improper if they are not paid to the United
States Treasury. If the payments are deemed personal dam-
ages, they are not authorized. 123 The court held the Electronic
Control Design settlement payments to be penalties. 124 The
court said that labeling them did not change the nature of the
payment. The award of attorneys' fees, which may only be
awarded to substantially prevailing parties, supported the
view that the plaintiffs had prevailed in the suit.'25
The court recognized Congress' desire in appropriate
cases to have payments made in CWA suit settlements go to
environmental projects.126 The court said that it would ap-
prove of a settlement which included payments to Oregon's
Water Quality Control Program because such a settlement
would conform to Congress' wish to encourage environmental
projects and would not violate the prohibition against paying
penalties to private citizens.'27 The court's underlying concern
in approving payments to public groups as opposed to private
groups is that the public groups are directly accountable to
the electorate. 28
B. The Decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's holding that the CWA requires payment of penalties
to the United States Treasury.'29 Accordingly, if the proposed
payments were penalties within the meaning of the CWA,
they must be paid to the United States Treasury.'3 °
121. Id. at 876-77.
122. Id. at 877.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 878.
127. Id. at 879.
128. Id.
129. Electronic Control Design H, 909 F.2d at 1354.
130. Id.
1992]
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
However, the court of appeals rejected the district court's
distinction between civil penalties paid to public and private
groups. The court of appeals held that if the amounts paid are
penalties they may not be paid to either private or state affili-
ated public groups but only to the United States Treasury.' 3 '
The court of appeals held that it was powerless under the
statute to order such penalties to either public or private
groups. 32
The court of appeals held the district court's refusal to
approve the proposed consent decree was an abuse of its dis-
cretion because the monies to be paid were not civil penal-
ties.1 33 No violation of the CWA was found or determined by
the proposed settlement. The court of appeals held that when
a defendant agrees before trial to make payments to environ-
mental organizations without admitting liability, the agree-
ment is simply part of an out-of-court settlement which the
parties are free to make.' 34
The standard to be used in determining whether to ap-
prove the consent judgment is whether the judgment is "fair,
reasonable and equitable and does not violate law or public
policy. ' 135 Review should not include inquiry into the merits
to determine the nature of the settlement terms because con-
sent judgments may contain terms which would have been un-
available had the suit been litigated through to completion. A
court may approve a consent judgment containing broader re-
lief, provided that the consent judgment complies with the
criteria set forth in Local No. 93.136
The court of appeals held that the consent decree com-
plied with the criteria laid out in Local No. 93137 and that the
131. Id. at 1356.
132. Id. at 1355.
133. Id. at 1356.
134. Id. at 1354.
135. Id. at 1355.
136. Id.
137. Id. The criteria which the settlement must satisfy to fall within the excep-
tion are that the settlement:
1) "must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject
matter jurisdiction;" Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525.
2) "comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings;" Id.
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proposed consent judgment "came within the general scope of
the case made by the pleadings .," The Sierra Club's com-
plaint was based on the allegation that Electronic Control De-
sign was not in compliance with the CWA, and the consent
judgment resolved that complaint.139
The court of appeals found that the consent judgment
furthered "the objectives upon which the law is based." 1 0 The
consent judgment required that Electronic Control Design
comply with its permit and make payments for environmental
use which furthered the national goal of clean water."" The
proposed consent judgment did not violate the statute upon
which the complaint was based because the legislative history
of the CWA states that Congress encourages "settlements of
this type which preserve the punitive nature of enforcement
actions while putting the funds collected to use on behalf of
environmental protection."" 2
The court of appeals held that there is nothing in the
CWA which provides for a limitation on these types of pay-
ments. The 1987 amendments to the CWA provide that pri-
vate parties must give the government a forty-five day notice
of a proposed consent judgment but contain no limitation on
the terms of a proposed consent judgment. 143
Finally, the court of appeals held that the proposed set-
tlement did "not dispose of the claims of a third party" 4 be-
cause the government still had the option to bring its own
suit.'"
3) "furthers the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based;"
Id.
4) "does not dispose of the claims of a third party".
Id. at 529.
138. Electronic Control Design H, 909 F.2d at 1355.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1986) re-
printed in 132 CONG. REc. H10.571 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
143. Electronic Control Design H, 909 F.2d at 1356.
144. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 529.
145. Electronic Control Design H at 1356 n.8.
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V. Analysis
A. Analysis of the Appropriate Degree of Inquiry for Ap-
proving a Consent Judgment
In Electronic Control Design H, the court of appeals
ruled the district court had misapplied the standard of review
in considering approval of the proposed consent judgment. In-
stead of examining the merits, the court of appeals focused its
review on whether the proposed agreement was in violation of
law or public policy. 46 The court noted the 1987 CWA
amendments failed to specify whether citizen groups as well
as the government could enter into environmentally beneficial
settlements.'4 7 In light of all the restrictions which the 1987
CWA amendments placed on citizen suits, the court of ap-
peals concluded that Congress sought to encourage environ-
mentally beneficial settlements without regard to whether the
plaintiff was the government or a citizen group. The court's
rationale for this conclusion was the absence of distinction be-
tween government and citizen plaintiffs in an otherwise com-
prehensive set of limitations.'4 8
The district court's interpretation of the standard of re-
view that the consent judgment be "fair, reasonable and equi-
table . . . and that the decree does not violate law or public
policy" 49 differed greatly from the interpretation of the court
of appeals. The district court's starting assumption was that
payment of penalties to private individuals would constitute a
violation of the CWA.' 50 The scope of review must include an
inquiry into the settlement's merits to determine whether the
settlement terms included penalties.1 5' The district court held
that the "'labeling' of the remedy [by the parties], therefore
clearly does not control"'' 5 and if settlement provided for
146. Id. at 1356.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Electronic Control Design I, 703 F. Supp. at 876. (quoting Sierra Club v.
Coca Cola, 673 F. Supp. 1555-56 (M.D. Fla. 1987)).
150. Id. at 877.
151. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 18.
152. Electronic Control Design I, 703 F. Supp. at 877.
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penalties payable to private persons, the settlement violated
the law.' 3
The holding of the district court views the settlement
payments realistically. Under a realistic view, a violator settles
the suit because it is in her best interests to limit the loss
when faced with the prospect of losing a suit and incurring
large legal costs. In this respect, consent decrees resemble plea
bargains,1 54 in which defendants agree to a lesser sentence in
return for saving the State the cost of a full trial. The district
court noted, that after approving a consent judgment, courts
must make a determination on the merits when deciding
whether to award attorneys fees.1 55 "If the Club is indeed the
prevailing party... the money received must be a penalty.
'
"
1 5 6
Such a characterization may not be completely accurate.
In Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,57
the Supreme Court held that district courts were without ju-
risdiction to hear CWA citizen suits for wholly past violations.
Since CWA violations are easy to prove,158 the principle issue
in many citizen suits is whether the basis of an ongoing viola-
tion exists.159 A consent judgment in this situation would re-
present a contractual compromise resolving jurisdiction rather
than a judgment on the merits of the case.
B. The Apparent Contradiction between Supreme Court
Statements and the Legislative History of the CWA
The central issue underlying the dispute in Electronic
Control Design is whether the CWA allows consent judgments
to provide for payments of penalties to persons other than the
United States Treasury. The government's authority for the
153. Id.
154. "The process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case
work out. . a disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lessor offense . . in return for a lighter sentence than
that possible for the graver charge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1037 (5th ed. 1979).
155. Electronic Control Design I, 703 F. Supp. at 877.
156. Id.
157. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
158. JORGENSON & KIMMEL, supra note 2, at 10.
159. Id. at 7.
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position that it does not are two statements by the Supreme
Court that penalties recovered under the CWA must be paid
to the United States Treasury.1 0 The Sierra Club's authority
for the contrary position is the conferee report to the 1987
CWA amendments which said that Congress encourages the
use of "penalties to fund research, development and other re-
lated problems."''1 Since penalties may not fund research or
other projects if they are paid to the United States Treasury,
the conferee report and the Supreme Court statements are in
apparent contradiction. The determination of which authority
controls is basic to deciding this issue. The district court, the
court of appeals, the government, and the Sierra Club treated
this apparent contradiction in different ways.
The district court ignored this contradiction and as a re-
sult produced a decision which is illogical and unsound. The
district court relied on the authority of the Supreme Court's
statements to hold settlement payments to environmental
groups illegal since all penalties must be paid to the United
States Treasury. 6 2 The district court then relied on the legis-
lative history as authority to approve of settlement payments
to a state affiliated environmental organization.' 63 Such a re-
sult is contradictory; if penalties must be paid to the United
States Treasury, then it is impermissible to pay them to ei-
ther a state agency or a private environmental group.16 4
The district court in Friends of the Earth v. Archer Dan-
iels Midland Co.' came to the same conclusion but relied on
a different analysis which was not contradictory. In its analy-
sis, the court held that the legislative history of the 1987 CWA
amendments indicated Congress encouraged that CWA penal-
160. "If the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may order injunctive
relief and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury." Gwaltney
of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987). "Under the
[CWA], civil penalties, payable to the Government, also may be ordered by the
court." Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
14 n.25 (1981).
161. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
162. Electronic Control Design 1, 703 F. Supp. at 877.
163. Id. at 879.
164. Electronic Control Design 11, 909 F.2d at 1354.
165. 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1779 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
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ties be put to use in environmental projects unrelated to the
original violation."'6 The court also held the CWA prohibited
payments to private individuals.'67 Accordingly, the court
could approve of penalty payments to state affiliated organiza-
tions but not to private ones."8" In order to reach this holding,
the court held that the Supreme Court's statements were not
applicable because they were dicta made after considering a
different issue."8 9
The government, in its brief, also ignored the conflict and
relied only on the Supreme Court's statements. The govern-
ment's position was that penalties must be paid to the United
States Treasury and may not be paid to either private or state
sponsored environmental projects.170 The EPA's Clean Water
Act-Penalty Policy for Civil Settlement Negotiations'
which applies to settlement of CWA actions in which the gov-
ernment is the plaintiff, embodies this position. The govern-
ment argued 72 that its construction of the CWA should be
given great deference by the court under Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council.73 The court of appeals
declined to accept the government's position on the grounds
that EPA's penalty policy only applied to actions in which the
government is the plaintiff. 74
The government's reliance on Supreme Court statements
is inadequate because it ignored relevant legislative history in
ascertaining congressional intent. Nonetheless, a case could be
made that the legislative history is not controlling because one
Congress may not supply legislative intent for what another
Congress has enacted. The 1987 CWA amendments did not
166. Id. at 1781.
167. Id. at 1782.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1781.
170. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 29 n.20.
171. Clean Water Act-Penalty Policy for Civil Settlement Negotiations (1986),
supra note 109.
172. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 21 n.12.
173. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). When an agency entrusted with the administration of a
statute interprets a statute, the courts must give that interpretation substantial
weight. Id. at 843-45.
174. Electronic Control Design H, 909 F.2d at 1354-55 n.6.
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change the remedies provided in the 1972 legislation.175 It is
the intent of the 1972 Congress, which enacted those reme-
dies, which is relevant to deciding to whom penalties may be
paid. On that basis, the Supreme Court statements could con-
trol, since they interpreted the intent of that Congress.
The counterargument is that the 1987 CWA amendments
provided a comprehensive scheme of regulation on the use of
citizen suits.1 76 These amendments incorporated the original
statutory language authorizing penalties into a revised
scheme. Congress' approval of the way penalties could be used
to benefit the environment is intrinsic to the revision. There-
fore, the legislative history explains the way carryover provi-
sions are used in the scheme.
Assuming that the legislative history of the CWA prop-
erly indicates congressional intent, punitive settlement pay-
ments may be made to entities other than the United States
Treasury. First, under traditional statutory interpretation,
courts consult the legislative history when statutory language
is ambiguous. 77 Second, conferee reports are accorded author-
itative weight in ascertaining congressional intent because
they are the reports which Congress reads before approving a
bill. '78 Third, the conferee report is explicit and unambiguous
in approving of such payments.'7 9 Such analysis would sup-
port the Sierra Club's contention that CWA penalties are
properly payable to fund environmental projects rather than
the United States Treasury.
However, even if settlement money may go to fund envi-
ronmental projects, the legislative history is silent with regard
to whether private citizen groups may administer the money.
In support of the position that a private group may adminis-
ter settlement money, the Sierra Club argued that citizen
suits under the CWA "have emerged as potent weapons for
175. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 § 319(d), Pub. L. No. 92-500, §
309 (d), 86 stat. 816, 860 (1972) as amended 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
176. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
177. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P, FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 697 (1988).
178. Id. at 709.
179. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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environmental enforcement,""18 and that "federal courts
around the country have routinely approved consent judg-
ments under which the money goes to organizations like those
named in the proposed judgment."'181
The thrust of the Sierra Club's argument seems to be
that because organizations like the Sierra Club have done
such a good job of enforcing the CWA when the government
has failed to act, the organizations can and should be trusted
to select environmental projects. Courts may be influenced to
allow private environmental organizations to have a role in
funding "research, development, and other related projects"'8 2
based on private organizations' track records in enforcing the
CWA. The court of appeals resolved this issue by holding that
Congress intended no distinction between citizen groups and
governmental entities administering environmental projects
funded through settlements because the comprehensive regu-
lation of citizen suits enacted in the 1987 CWA amendments
made no such distinction. 83
It appears that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
resolved the conflict between the Supreme Court's statements
and the legislative history in a manner consistent with con-
gressional intent and with proper deference to the Supreme
Court. The court accomplished this through legal sleight of
hand. The court of appeals agreed with the Supreme Court
that CWA settlement penalties must be paid to the United
States Treasury. 84 However, the court of appeals accom-
plished the congressional goal of funding environmental
projects with CWA settlement payments by holding that the
payments were not penalties.' 85 Although these non-penalties
were beyond the scope of the relief authorized by the CWA,
the court of appeals held that it could approve them through
the exception created in Local No. 93.18'
180. Brief for Sierra Club, supra note 18, at 14 (quoting U.S. Brief at 2).
181. Id. at 15.
182. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
183. Electronic Control Design 11, 909 F.2d at 1356.
184. Id. at 1354.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1354-55.
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The court did not achieve this harmony without incurring
a cost. The appellate decision is confusing in that it uses dif-
ferent concepts of penalties in the same analysis, is unrealis-
tic, and gives relief broader than the statute allows.
The appellate decision creates confusion: at the same
time settlement payments are not penalties in the sense the
Supreme Court's statements use the term, they are penalties
in the context of the legislative history. The appellate decision
narrowly defines the term penalty not to include settlement
payments, while relying on the legislative history, which
makes clear that such settlements are penalties, as authority
to approve of the payments.1 87 Under the appellate decision, a
reviewing court should not consider a proposed settlement a
penalty, and yet should consider the objective criteria for pen-
alties in determining whether a settlement is "fair and
adequate."
Furthermore, the logic that the settlement payments are
not penalties because the consent decree contains no admis-
sion of liability is not realistic. The district court pointed out
that labeling by the parties did not change the nature of the
remedy and that the court must make a determination on lia-
bility in awarding legal fees.18 8 Moreover, the legislative his-
tory only approves of settlement payments which are punitive
in nature. 89
Finally, as non-penalties, the payments are outside the
scope of relief authorized in the CWA. Consequently, the
court must rely on the exception created in Local No. 93 as
authority for approving the consent judgment. On its face, the
language of the Local No. 93190 exception to CWA settlements
is broad enough to support application, but the exception has
never been considered by the Supreme Court. There are, how-
ever, differences between the factual and policy considerations
187. The legislative history's language refers to "penalties to fund research" and
"settlements of this type. . . to preserve the punitive nature." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1986) reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. H10,571 (daily ed.
Oct. 15, 1986).
188. Electronic Control Design I, 703 F. Supp. at 877.
189. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
190. 478 U.S. at 525, 529 (1986).
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present in Local No. 93 and those present in CWA citizen suit
settlements upon which the Supreme Court might hold that
the exception does not apply. Local No. 93 was a Title VII
discrimination suit in which the issue was whether the court
could approve a settlement which provided "race-conscious
relief that may benefit nonvictims." 191 The payment of CWA
settlement monies to unrelated environmental projects raises
the different issue of whether the parties to a CWA settlement
can direct settlement money to environmental projects rather
than the United States Treasury.192 In Local No. 93 the ex-
ception was recognized so that parties could take voluntarily
actions which would have violated their constitutional rights
if imposed by the court. In CWA settlements, the parties' set-
tlement agreements affects the rights of a third party, the gov-
ernment, to receive settlement money.
The Supreme Court might find this difference important.
The present Supreme Court has exercised judicial restraint
and held that courts may not exercise powers which properly
belong to Congress.19 3 The power of the purse, the raising and
allocation of public money, is one of the main functions of
Congress.""' On the basis of the separation of powers doctrine,
the Supreme Court might hold that the CWA does not au-
thorize district courts to approve settlements in which citizen
plaintiffs direct public money to fund environmental projects.
The language of the legislative history is general and does not
specifically authorize private citizens to enter into such settle-
191. Id.
192. Electronic Control Design 11, 909 F.2d at 1354.
193. For example, in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989) the
Supreme Court held that federal courts may not, through their equitable powers, cure
technical deficiencies in the RCRA citizen suit provision waiting requirements. "[This
court] is not at liberty to create an exception where Congress has declined to do so."
Id.
194. "Under the Constitution no money may be drawn from the Treasury of the
United States except 'in consequence of appropriations made by law.' U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 7. The term 'law' here means an Act of Congress. This provision concen-
trates upon Congress the responsibility for appropriations, subject to the veto power
of the President." J. MATHEWS, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, 246 (1st ed.
1932).
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ments. 19 5 The Supreme Court might narrowly interpret the
legislative history and hold that the exception created in Lo-
cal No. 93 does not apply to CWA citizen suits.
It would have been neater and less complicated had the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that settlement
penalties could be paid to private organizations. However, its
decision does have the virtue of having avoided a lower court
dismissal of Supreme Court statements as- irrelevant. In prac-
tical application, the decision recognizes that citizen groups in
appropriate circumstances can have input in directing settle-
ment money to environmental projects. If the case is viewed
as a fight for control over settlement money between the gov-
ernment and environmental groups, the decision allows the
citizen groups in some circumstances to have some control to
direct settlement money toward environmentally beneficial
projects. In doing so, the decision recognizes that environmen-
tally beneficial projects administered by private groups bene-
fit public as opposed to private interests.
The decision raises another important control issue. The
legislative history of the 1987 CWA amendments recognizes
that the government may validly object to a consent judgment
on the grounds that the settlement interferes with enforce-
ment priorities.""A Arguably, the government could maintain
that the payment of penalty money to environmental projects
would have less deterrent effect and interfere with the govern-
ment's- enforcement priorities. In such a case, a reviewing
court would have the difficult task of apportioning settlement
money between the citizen groups and the government.
C. Protecting the Public Interest Consistent with Electronic
Control Design II
As approved, the consent judgment in Electronic Control
Design II does not insure that the settlement money will be
spent on public welfare. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit accepted without question that the set-
195. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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tlement money would be put to proper use in environmentally
beneficial projects.' That assumption may not be justified.
While the agreement stipulated that the money was to be put
to environmentally beneficial use, the agreement contained no
effective controls to insure that the money would promote the
public welfare. 19 8 The agreement provided only for payments
to private environmental organizations for use in undefined
activities and projects."99 It is foreseeable that after a consent
judgment is approved and the parties are not under the super-
vision of the court, the settlement monies might be used to
promote private rather than public welfare.
The district court addressed this problem by holding that
it would approve of the agreement if it were reformulated to
make the payment to a state affiliated agency for use in envi-
ronmental work.200 Such a settlement insures that the money
benefits the environment, and is not diverted to private use
because the administering agency is accountable to the public.
The district court in Pennsylvania Environmental De-
fense Found. v. Bellefonte Borough2 °' insured that settlement
money would be spent on proper purposes by requiring that
the money be spent on "mitigation projects."20 2 Under this
approach, the money is not likely to be misspent because it is
tied to specific environmental work. Both decisions can be
seen as a compromise between honoring Congress' wish that
settlement funds be used to better the environment and fulfil-
ling the court's responsibility to insure that settlement monies
be put to public benefit. The district court in Electronic Con-
trol Design accomplished this by limiting the user, while the
Bellefonte court did so by limiting the use.
Under the court of appeals reasoning in Electronic Con-
trol Design H, restrictions imposed by the court on either use
or user should be improper. Under the -appellate decision,
such court imposed restrictions would violate separation of
197. Electronic Control Design H, 909 F.2d at 1355.
198. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 25-26.
199. Id.
200. Electronic Control Design I, 703 F. Supp. at 879.
201. 718 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
202. Id at 437-38.
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powers because, by comprehensively regulating the area, Con-
gress had placed restrictions it deemed adequate on citizen
suit settlements." 3 Imposing additional restrictions would
amount to legislating by a reviewing court. In the case of use
restrictions, the legislative history specifically notes that set-
tlement money may go to unrelated environmental projects.
Nevertheless, settlement terms which place restrictions on the
use or user could play an important, even determinative, role
in court approval of consent judgments. Use or user limita-
tions in settlement terms could serve as evidence that a pro-
posed settlement benefits public rather than private interests.
In reviewing a proposed consent judgment, one of the
courts' essential inquiries is whether the "public interest" is
protected.04 Whether a proposed settlement benefits public
rather than private interests is a legitimate "public interest"
question to be answered before a reviewing court grants ap-
proval. In order that this issue be satisfactorily examined, the
courts could establish a rebuttable presumption that proposed
consent judgments benefit private not public purposes. The
proponents of the consent judgment would have the burden of
convincing the court that the settlement would benefit the
public welfare before the settlement could be approved. Pro-
ponents of a settlement could meet this burden by structuring
their agreement to provide for restrictions on either the use or
the user which would serve as controls to insure the money
would be spent on the public welfare. Of course, proponents
might justify the terms in other more difficult ways.20 5
The advantage of such a rebuttable presumption ap-
proach is that the court's authority derives from protecting
the "public interest," rather than from implying restrictions
203. Electronic Control Design 1H, 909 F.2d at 1356.
204. United States v. Ketchikan, 439 F. Supp 83, 86 (D. Alaska 1977).
205. The key distinction is that any restrictions in the settlement agreement
would be voluntarily taken by the parties to meet their burden of proof, rather than
imposed by the court. However, since an agreement would have to guarantee that
money would not be misapplied to private interests in the future, satisfying a review-
ing court might be difficult. The reviewing court could consider the track record of
the administering organization, limits on the use, or pressing environmental need in
evaluating the potential for misapplication, but in most cases the parties would have
difficulty satisfying the reviewing court that the money would not be misapplied.
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to the statute. Authority for a court adopting a rebuttable
presumption can be found in the legislative history of the
CWA, case law, and common sense.
1. Statutory Authority
The 1987 amendments to the CWA provide that propo-
nents of consent judgments must give notice to the govern-
ment forty-five days before the consent judgment can be ap-
proved. 20 6 The purpose of this provision is to provide the
government with the opportunity to object to any abusive or
collusive settlements. °7 Since the government would make
any objections to a reviewing court, the reviewing court must
have the power to disapprove of a settlement which is abusive
or collusive. A proposed consent judgment which provides for
payments to private interests under the guise of being for the
public benefit would be illegal as well as abusive and collusive.
2. Case Authority
In many contexts, courts have placed the burden of proof
on the party which would benefit from the courts' ruling.0 8
Courts have traditionally used presumptions which allocate
the burden of proof to insure that issues are litigated fairly
before the courts.209 In United States v. Ketchikan,21 ° the
court considered the issue of whether the proponents of a pro-
posed consent judgment would have to justify those terms to
the reviewing court. Although the court in that case deferred
to the government's prior fact finding and held that it was
206. 33 U.S.C. § 1356(c)(3) (1988).
207. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
208. DAVDo F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE 63 (1991).
209. See Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (holding that a note
was presumed to be a security, and that a person could rebut this presumption);
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986) (holding that an attorney is pre-
sumed to be competent and that a person who was convicted while being represented
by that attorney could rebut that presumption); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (holding that a rebuttable presumption of improper use of peremptory chal-
lenges was created by defendant's prima facia showing).
210. 430 F. Supp. 83 (D. Alaska 1977).
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unnecessary to further justify its settlement's terms,21' the
court's logic supports imposing such a burden when private
citizens are the parties. The court's approach balanced the ne-
cessity of safeguards to protect the public interest against the
court's interest in conserving judicial resources. The court
held that where the government is a party, the comments of
the amicus curiae adequately protected the public interest." 2
Under the court's rationale, greater potential for abuse would
justify increased allocation of judicial resources for additional
safeguards.
3. Common Sense
The judicial system normally depends on the adversarial
relationship of the parties as the mechanism which insures
relevant issues are litigated before the court. In the case of
settlements which resolve citizen suits, there is no adversarial
relationship which insures that the public interest is pro-
tected, since both sides want the agreement ratified.213 Con-
ceivably, parties to such a consent agreement could propose
settlement terms which inadequately protect the public inter-
est in order to obtain a more favorable settlement for them-
selves. Unlike the government, private parties cannot be pre-
sumed to be acting in the public interest. To properly bring
public interest concerns before a reviewing court, some addi-
tional mechanism is needed. A rebuttable presumption would
provide an effective mechanism because it would create an in-
centive for the parties to make sure that the public interest is
protected.
Besides creating an incentive for the parties to protect
the public interest, a rebuttable presumption would also allo-
cate the costs of settling the suit in an effective manner. The
primary burden would be on the proponents of a proposed
agreement with a lesser burden on the judicial system and the
government. A rebuttable presumption would create an incen-
tive for proponents of a settlement to include in the proposed
211. Id. at 86.
212. Id. at 86.
213. SCHWARZSCHILD supra note 40, at 888.
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settlement internal controls to protect the public interest. The
costs on the courts could also be limited because only the is-
sues which affected the public interest would have to be justi-
fied. The need for additional expenditures of judicial re-
sources would be weighed against the danger to the public
interest. The cost on the government would also be minimized
because the government would avoid an expensive case by
case investigation of the terms of consent judgments. Since a
mechanism to protect the public interest would be present in
all consent orders, the government could marshall its re-
sources to object to those proposed consent orders which it
found most objectionable.
VI. Conclusion
Electronic Control Design II is a pro-environmental deci-
sion that recognizes that citizen enforcers of the CWA may
have a voice in directing settlement monies toward environ-
mental projects. The decision expands citizen participation in
the enforcement of the CWA in two ways. First, the decision
creates an incentive for private citizens to take a larger en-
forcement role in the CWA. Second, the decision allows citi-
zen enforcers to fund the solving of some of the country's en-
vironmental problems.
However, the Ninth Circuit's recognition of congressional
approval of such settlements creates a problem for the district
courts. In considering whether to approve of a proposed agree-
ment, a reviewing court must decide.whether the agreement
benefits public or private interests. An agreement which pro-
motes public interests would be acceptable, whereas one
which promotes private interests would not. In the normal
course of business, district courts are ill-equipped to make
this distinction. Courts are adjudicative, rather than investi-
gative and depend on the adverse relationship of the parties
to represent the interests involved. Because of a potential con-
flict of interest between the private parties and the "public
interest," the adversarial relationship of the parties is not suf-
ficient to insure that the public interest is represented. Fur-
thermore, the allocation of resources to remedy environmental
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ills is essentially a legislative act, which requires assessing the
public need. Thus, a reviewing court is faced with making a
legislative decision with incomplete information.
Courts reviewing settlements will try to narrow the scope
of consent agreements so that the court can comfortably eval-
uate whether the agreement promotes the "public interest."
The decision in Electronic Control Design H broadens the
range of terms which consent judgments, may include by hold-
ing that Congress did not intend limitations. Because of the
inherent limitations of the ability of courts to review these
terms, other circuits may not follow the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion and may hold that limitations on use or user are permis-
sible. This Article has proposed a method by which a review-
ing court could effectively limit the terms of a consent
judgment, consistent with Electronic Control Design H. The
advantage of the Articles' approach is that it is grounded in
legitimate judicial power, rather than on implying statutory
restrictions.
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